Risk Assessment Matrix
**Date**: 20 January 2026 | **Assessment ID**: DPIA-MB-2026-001-RISKS
Risk Assessment Matrix
MirrorBuddy DPIA - Detailed Risk Analysis
Date: 20 January 2026 | Assessment ID: DPIA-MB-2026-001-RISKS
Risk Scoring Methodology
Scale: Likelihood (1=rare, 5=likely) × Impact (1=minor, 5=critical) = Risk Level
- Level 5-7: HIGH - Require immediate mitigation
- Level 3-4: MEDIUM - Require ongoing monitoring
- Level 1-2: LOW - Document and review annually
Risk Assessment Matrix
| ID | Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Score | Level | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-01 | Unauthorized access to conversation data | 2 | 5 | 10 | HIGH | Encryption + session auth (src/lib/auth/validateSessionAuth.ts) + audit logging (src/lib/safety/audit/) + access controls |
| R-02 | AI generates harmful content to minor | 2 | 5 | 10 | HIGH | Jailbreak detector (src/lib/safety/jailbreak-detector.ts) + content filter (src/lib/safety/content-filter.ts) + output sanitizer (src/lib/safety/output-sanitizer.ts) |
| R-03 | Parent consent not obtained (COPPA) | 2 | 5 | 10 | HIGH | Email verification (src/lib/compliance/coppa-service.ts) + timeout enforcement + PLANNED: Complete email verification (T1-03) |
| R-04 | Age-gating bypassed via prompt injection | 2 | 4 | 8 | HIGH | Age-gating matrix (src/lib/safety/age-gating-matrix.ts) + jailbreak detection + content filter sanitization |
| R-05 | Data breach via Azure OpenAI API | 1 | 5 | 5 | MEDIUM | Microsoft DPA compliance + network encryption (TLS 1.3) + automated monitoring alerts + 72-hour breach response |
| R-06 | Accessibility setting data misuse | 2 | 3 | 6 | MEDIUM | Access logs per user (src/lib/safety/monitoring/logging.ts) + cookie storage (90 days max) + user audit trail |
| R-07 | Vulnerable subject targeted by AI | 2 | 4 | 8 | MEDIUM | Safety guardrails per DSA profile (src/lib/accessibility/) + character intensity dial (ADR 0031) + monitoring |
| R-08 | Data retention period exceeded | 2 | 3 | 6 | MEDIUM | Scheduled deletion job (vercel.json cron daily 03:00 UTC) + cascade delete implementation + 30-day grace period |
| R-09 | Parental dashboard provides excessive insight | 2 | 3 | 6 | MEDIUM | Limited activity view (no conversation content) + audit trail with timestamps + parental consent requirement |
| R-10 | AI system trained on student data | 1 | 5 | 5 | MEDIUM | Azure DPA prohibits training; no model fine-tuning on student data; Ollama fallback is local-only |
| R-11 | Inference of sensitive attributes (disability) | 2 | 4 | 8 | MEDIUM | Accessibility profiles are opt-in; no forced profiling; can be disabled anytime by user or parent; stored in cookies only |
| R-12 | Vendor lock-in (Azure OpenAI) | 2 | 3 | 6 | MEDIUM | Ollama fallback provider (src/lib/ai/providers.ts) + abstraction layer + data not dependent on vendor |
Risk Treatment Summary
HIGH RISKS (Scores 8-10)
R-01: Unauthorized Access
- Current mitigation: Session-based auth + user isolation + audit trail
- Residual risk: LOW - Encrypted storage + TLS + access controls reduce to acceptable
- Owner: Information Security Team
- Review: Quarterly
R-02: Harmful AI Content
- Current mitigation: 5-layer safety defense (jailbreak detection, content filtering, output sanitization, age-gating, audit trail)
- Residual risk: LOW - Multiple layers reduce likelihood
- Owner: Safety Engineering Team
- Review: Continuous (automated monitoring)
R-03: Missing COPPA Consent
- Current mitigation: Email verification flow with 48-hour expiry
- Residual risk: MEDIUM - Email delivery issues possible
- Planned mitigation: T1-03 - Complete email verification (Q1 2026)
- Owner: Compliance Team
- Review: Post-implementation test
R-04: Age-Gating Bypass
- Current mitigation: Multi-layer age-gating + jailbreak detection
- Residual risk: LOW - Jailbreak patterns catch prompt injection
- Owner: Safety Engineering Team
- Review: Quarterly threat model update
R-07: Vulnerable Subject Targeting
- Current mitigation: Character intensity dial + DSA safety guardrails
- Planned mitigation: T1-02 - Human escalation pathway (Q1 2026)
- Residual risk: MEDIUM - Human review adds safety valve
- Owner: Product Security Team
- Review: Quarterly
R-11: Sensitive Attribute Inference
- Current mitigation: Opt-in accessibility (no forced profiling) + cookie storage only
- Residual risk: LOW - User control + limited storage
- Owner: Privacy Team
- Review: Annual
MEDIUM RISKS (Scores 4-6)
R-05: Third-Party Breach
- Mitigation: Microsoft DPA + encryption + monitoring
- Response plan: 72-hour DPA notification if required
- Owner: Infrastructure Team
R-06: Accessibility Misuse
- Mitigation: Access logging + limited retention (90 days)
- Owner: Privacy Team
R-08: Data Retention Exceeded
- Mitigation: Automated cleanup job + grace period
- Owner: Database Team
R-09: Parental Over-Insight
- Mitigation: Limited activity view + audit trail
- Owner: Product Team
R-10: Model Training
- Mitigation: DPA prohibition + local fallback
- Owner: AI Safety Team
R-12: Vendor Lock-In
- Mitigation: Ollama abstraction + data portability
- Owner: Platform Team
Monitoring & Escalation
Continuous Monitoring (Automated):
- Jailbreak attempts flagged via
src/lib/safety/versioning/jailbreak-flagging.ts - Violation tracking via
src/lib/safety/monitoring/violation-tracker.ts - Audit logs via
src/lib/safety/audit/audit-trail-service.ts
Escalation Triggers:
- HIGH risk violation (R-02: harmful content) → Immediate human review + user notification
- MEDIUM risk with pattern (3+ R-03 COPPA failures) → Compliance team alert
- Data breach (R-05) → Emergency response (24-hour assessment, 72-hour DPA notification)
Risk Acceptance Sign-Off
| Role | Review Date | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Product Security Lead | 20 Jan 2026 | ACCEPTED with planned mitigations (T1-02, T1-03) |
| Data Protection Officer | 20 Jan 2026 | ACCEPTED - No prior consultation required |
| Legal Team | 20 Jan 2026 | ACCEPTED - Compliant with GDPR, AI Act, COPPA |
Next Risk Review: 20 April 2026 (Quarterly) Planned Mitigation Completion: 31 March 2026 (Q1 2026)
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